The study of Free Competition, Monopolies and Antitrust laws have a really important meaning for the developing of free markets in a global context. Free Competition is currently one of the main requirements to get the achievements of efficiency, transparency and dynamism in any market, especially in developing countries where these factors need to be considered as important instruments of economic growing and poverty decreasing. East Asia is an area that have been implemented several reforms structured upon the basis of free market, which it means a sustainable growing of GDP, opening to Foreign Direct Investment, protection of property rights and eliminating barriers to new actors in national contexts. Tradition, respect, formality and sometimes some suspicion against foreigners, have been adapted by a huge interest to study and learn many issues about concepts of freedom, property rights, and also, the way how the global market is working. The emergence of China as a big actor in the worldwide economy, the very American inspired regulatory model of Korea, the influence of United States in the Japanese constitutional design and the antitrust law -except in some substance and enforcement -, and also the application in Chile of many practices and doctrines of the Chicago School of economics, imply an interesting object of analysis in this paper. The text analyzes the main characteristics of the antitrust laws applied to the experiences of three countries in East Asia (China, Korea and Japan) and exploring some similarities with the antitrust system of Chile. The text establishes that the four countries implemented free market economies, and as a consequence of this, a collection of legal rules on monopolies and protection of the free competition. Also, all the cases studied are experiencing the phenomena of corporate concentration, which has encouraged to its regulatory agencies to design administrative rules called "Merger Guidelines" and implies a tremendous challenge for the new Antimonopoly Chinese Law.
Introduction
The study of Free Competition, Monopolies and all that is called Antitrust laws have a really important meaning for the developing of free markets in a global context. Free
Competition is currently one of the main requirements to get the achievements of efficiency, transparency and dynamism in any market, especially in developing countries where these factors need to be considered as important instruments of economic growing and poverty decreasing.
East Asia is an area that have been implemented several reforms structured upon the basis of free market, which it means a sustainable growing of GDP, opening to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), protection of property rights and eliminating barriers to new actors in national contexts. Tradition, respect, and formality have been supplemented by a huge interest to study and learn many issues about concepts of freedom, property rights, and also, the way how the global market is working. Although the very first idea about the American origin of many regulations in global markets, many Asian countries, especially China, have known how to adapt and create these global rules to their own contexts. In fact, today this land shows to the world its new Anti-Monopoly Law of the People"s Republic of China, which implies many and interesting challenges.
The emergence of China as a big actor in the worldwide economy, the experience and regulatory design on Antitrust issues that other Asian countries exhibit, and the Chilean antimonopoly legal system imply an interesting object of analysis in this paper.
A famous text book (Viscusi et alt, 1998) states:
"the theory of market structures as presented in most microeconomics textbooks, consist of models of perfect competition, monopoly, oligopolies, and monopolistic competition.
Because these theoretical models are so abstract, they have proved to be of limited value to economists interested in understanding real -world market" 1 .
In the same sense, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen (2000) say that "in a monopoly there is only one supplier, so that firm and industry are identical. A monopoly can arise and persist only where there are barriers to entry that make it impossible for competing firms to appear. In general, such barriers can arise from two sources: first, from statutory and other legal restrictions on entry; and second, from technological conditions of production known as economies of scale." 2 Towards all the basic and necessary considerations of microeconomics theory, a study of antitrust law basically pretends to explain regulations and achievements of these policies. This is the reason by which, in a context of global business, Head (2007) says that there are at least 8 policy goals of competition law: 3 (1) "protecting consumer welfare by preventing the undue exercise of market power;
(2) "enhancing economic efficiency;" (3) "facilitating economic liberalization;" (4) " preserving and encouraging the development of market economies;" (5) "sponsoring economic pluralism and the dispersion of socio economic-power; (6) "ensuring fairness and equity in marketplace transactions;" (7) " promoting the public interest including concerns related to industrial competitiveness, and;" (8) " protecting opportunities for small and medium business" Therefore, this paper analyses the essential issues related to the following research question: Are there some similarities between the Antitrust Laws established in East Asiaessentially China, Korea, Japan and Chile?
Anti-competitive conducts and anti-competitive structures
The practice and the regulatory issues on antitrust laws distinguish between anti competitive conducts and anti competitive structures. Acts or conducts are related to facts which its author is a man or a corporation. An anti competitive structure is the effect of the reform of the legal nature of a company supported in a new administrative design, for instance. For example, the change in the legal form of a limited partnership to a corporation, or from a national corporation to a joint venture or a bigger Multinational corporation, can be effects of a merger or acquisition. Therefore, the change of the legal structure of a company can generate implications on antitrust issues.
As mentioned earlier, one of the most usual operations of corporate growing is called merger. Merger has a strictly legal meaning and has nothing to do with how the combined companies are to be operated in the future. A merger occurs when one corporation is combined with and disappears into another corporation. For instance, the Missouri Corporation, just like the river, merges and disappears corporately into the This is the result of a rigorous process of stabilization for a free market system and one of the most known tools used to strengthen the free market economy consisted of many rounds of privatization of state owned companies. The first round of privatizations began few months after the arrival of the military government and it allowed the restitution to the original private owners of the assets expropriated by the government that ruled during 1970 during to 1973 during . Then, between 1975 during and 1978 Chile suffered a complicated situation originated by the Oil Crisis prices, and in 1982 the country was hit by an important financial crisis, in the middle of a harsh recession. Thus, from 1986 the country began an interesting economic recovery leaded by Finance Minister Hernan Buchi, a Columbia University educated economist, who was the author of the second round of privatizations. This second round of privatization focused in utility companies (energy, telecommunications, banks, pension, health insurances, and others). Since 1990 an increasing volume of Foreign Direct Investment allowed the country to get good figures in GDP, stability, inflation and employment.
This process of consolidation encouraged the growing of great corporate groups.
According to the definition of the article 96 of Act stock Market Number 18.045 of 1981 are:
"entities that have such links on its property, administration or responsibility credit, which they presume that the economic performance and financial position of its members is guided by the common interests of the group or subordinate to them or, there are financial risks common in the credits granted them or the acquisition of securities that emit" 6 . Therefore, this law defines a corporate group or "group of corporations", but another norm rules the issues about Free Competition, which was written in 1973, named Decree Law number 211, reformed by current Law N. 19.911 7
In the case of Korea, according to Kwon, these two broad categories, and further sub-divides them among the following subject matters: (1) under restrictive business practices: monopolies, business combinations, concerted actions, resale price maintenance and other restrictive business practices, and (2) under unfair competition: impediments to fair competition, counterfeit commodities or trademarks, false, untrue and misleading advertisements, damage to business reputation, improper multi-level sales (e.g., via pyramid schemes) and other deceptive or unfair business conduct. Once a case is received within the commission¡¦s jurisdiction, it is delegated to its departments according to subject matter, and decided via a committee meeting." 11
China from the end of the 1970"s, during the period of Premier Deng Xiaoping, began a deep process of economic reforms, designing an oriented market economy. Some authors, such as Nolan (2001) believes that this process had a big influence of the American style of business, and he states that "the Chicago economist George Stigler concluded that as much as 85 per cent of the USA economy in the mid -twenty century was "competitive". Friedman himself thought that there was "a general bias and tendency to overemphasize the importance of the big versus the small". Friedman"s lecture tours of China in the 1990"s were received with great enthusiasm by Chinese audiences anxious to learn about the real nature of advanced capitalism and to understand the sources of the USA "s prosperity" 12 .
Xinzhu Zhang and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang establish that:
"despite its increasingly prominent role in the global economy, China has never had a comprehensive competition law to protect the fruits of its market -driven economic reform. The current situation is that the new Chinese Antimonopoly Law will become effective the next August 1 st , 2008. This is the effect of a huge and interesting legislative and regulatory effort that states its main five goals in the first article: "This law is enacted for the purposes of: (1) preventing and prohibiting monopolistic conduct; (2) protecting fair market competition; (3) promoting efficiency of economic operation; (4) safeguarding the interests of consumers and the public interests; and (5) promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy"
Structures that can generate monopoly positions
This brief research about the situation of China, Korea, Japan in East Asia, and Chile, in South America, allowed to identify some specific corporate structures that per se do not generate an illegal position related to an antitrust issue, but in certain cases, can be an important factor or a basis to create a monopoly position. The four cases studied reveal high levels of corporate concentration, as it will be analyzed. All of four cases have needed to strength the natural regulation about corporate groups with further administrative rules about the explosive growing of corporate groups.
The first case is about China and the "Enterprise Groups", because although China did not have a clear and systematic antitrust regime, the recommendations of the 13 Zhang, Xinzhu and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua "The Antimonopoly Law in china: Where do we stand?" Competition Policy International, Autumn 2007, Vol.3, N.2, pp.186. WTO have encouraged the new Antimonopoly Law. The state property of the most of Chinese enterprises was designed upon the basis of a kind of "holding state companies"into the strategy of National team"s development -called Enterprise group, created at the beginnings of the 1980"s. According to Sutherland this strategy was "closely related to the emergence of inter -enterprise production agreement" 14
In the second case, Korea and the Chaebol, the structure of these groups is one of the best known forms to design a corporate in Korea. In the same idea of the different kinds of corporate growing, chaebol are business groups, whose members operates linked among each other. Koe and Pattnaik in a paper from 2007, quoting Yoo and Lee, define a chaebol as "a large business group that consists of formally independent firms, operating in diverse industries and controlled by the family members of the founder" 15 . According to this study, and the information that the authors collected of the Korean FTC, in 1997 highlights Hyundai, Samsung, LG, Daewoo, SK, Sangyong,Hanjin, Hanhw and Kumho.
In respect to the third case, Japan and the Keiretsu, this is a very controversial concept. From an antitrust view, the breakdown is important because many of these groups have the capability to generate a dominant position in a certain market, more than the size of the conglomerate. Scholars Weinstein and Yafeh wrote in 1995 a really interesting study about the collusive or competitive behavior of the keiretsu in Japanese market, and they concluded that many financial keiretsu, especially banks "tend also to impose intensified competition in markets where the keiretsu are strong. Thus, contrary to the popular belief, financial keiretsu do not restrain, but instead intensify competition. Main bank influence, 14 Other scholars as Miwa and Ramseyer (2001) state that the classic interpretations about the nature of the keiretsu are simply wrong and "central to so many accounts of postwar Japan, the keiretsu corporate groups have never had economic substance. Conceived from ideas committed to lacting "domination" by "monopoly capital", they found an early audience among western scholars searching for evidence of culture specific-group behavior in Japan. By the 1990"s , they had moved into mainstream economies studies, and keiretsu dummies appeared in virtually all econometric regressions of Japanese industrial or corporate structure. Yet the keiretsu began as a figment of the academic imagination, and they remind that today" 17
In the fourth case, Chile and the "Grupos empresariales" according to the definition of the article 96 of Chilean Act Stock Market Number 18.045 of 1981, these are "entities that have such links on its property, administration or responsibility credit, which they presume that the economic performance and financial position of its members is guided by the common interests of the group or subordinate to them or, there are financial risks common in the credits granted them or the acquisition of securities that emit" 18 . Therefore, this law defines a corporate group or "group of corporations"
Laws and regulations
In Korea, the main source is the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of 1980, which article 1 "prevents the abuse of market dominance by and excessive concentration of economic power in enterprises and regulates undue concerted acts and unfair trade practices, thereby promoting a fair and free competition. This is ultimately aimed at ensuring creative corporate activities, protecting consumer interests and pursuing a balanced development of the nation's economy." 19 The same principle appears in the new Antimonopoly Law of the People"s Republic of China. In Japan, the main source is the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade of 1947. In Chile, the antitrust system is integrated mainly by the decree Law 211, of 1973, but reformed by Law 19.911 of 2004, which created the Free Competition defense tribunal.
Agencies
According to Zhang and Yanhua Zhang, the old Chinese system was an "a multi- 
Corporate concentration and the situation of the Merger guidelines
The increasing GDP of these countries and the global phenomena of mergers and acquisitions have increased the level of corporate concentration in some sectors.
Developing countries, with a strong basis of liberalization and foreign direct and indirect investment, are able to experience higher grades of concentration, which is one of the common regulatory issues in the four countries analyzed. The new law states the treatment of the issue in chapter four, called "Concentration of undertakings" establishing that:
"Concentration of undertakings means the following circumstances: (1) a merger of undertakings;
(2) an acquisition by and undertaking of the control of other undertakings through acquiring The Herfindhal -Hirschman Index (HHI) is the sum of the squares of the market shares of every firm in the relevant market" 28 .
This last model is one of the most applied in the regulations of the four countries.
Japan is using it, because the Japanese "Old Merger Guidelines" made no mention of the HHI, which has become a key touchstone in American and European merger review. The HHI, a metric of market concentration, has been very prominent in American merger review since 1982. In particular, the US. Merger Guidelines presume that markets with an HHI below 1000 are unconcentrated, those with an HHI between 1000 and 1800 are only "moderately concentrated", and those with an HHI above 1800 are "highly concentrated.
Where a market has an HHI of above 1800, a merger that increases HHI by more than 100
is considered presumptively to increase or enhance market power or facilitate its use" 29 
Conclusions
This research stated that: (a) the countries analyzed developed their free market economies, implementing very liberal and structural reforms, which meant important growing in their GDP, high levels of Foreign Direct Investment and exports and imports.
Three of these -Japan, Korea and Chile -followed the model of tutelary democracy with very technocratic economies that encouraged privatizations and de regulation of many the issue of corporate concentration, designing the same kind of instruments called "guidelines for Mergers and acquisitions". In the same sense, Korea and Japan has integrated the HHI index to the analysis of the cases on Antitrust.
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